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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FLORENCE SCHWEITZER,
Pla~ntvff and Re-spondent,
-vs.HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCKING COMPANY, LLOYD V. HIGGENBOTI-IAM, and WE~S~TER.N
.AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants,
and
FRED SULLIVAN,
Defendant, Cross-Complainant and
Respondent,
-vs.I\'" AN SHEFFY,
[>t a.£nt£ff ~n I ntervent~on and
Respondent.

C.ase No. 921

BRIEF OF LLOYD V. HIGGENBOTHAM AND
vVESTERN AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY,
APPELLANTS
THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On April 20, 1957, at about 10:30 P.M., on Highway
30, approximately 14 miles west of Castle Rock in Summit County, Utah, Harvey Stone, an employee of the
S & I Trucking Company was driving said company's
truck eastvvard vvithin the scope of his employment when
1
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it ran out of fuel and stalled on an up-grade partially
blocking the eastbound traffic lanes. In attempting to
start the engine Harvey Stone was assisted by Ivan
Sheffy, also an employee of S & I Trucking Company
who had parked his truck further eastwa:vd and walked
back to help Stone. While so parked, an eastbound
Western Auto Transport truck driven by Lloyd V.
Higgenbotham, an employee of said company, and while
in the scop,e of his employment collided wrth the rear of
the trailer of the S & I truck injuring the drivers of both
vehicles, I van Sheffy and Fred Sullivan who was riding
in the sleeper compartn1ent of the cab of the vV estern
Auto Transport truck. Fred Sullivan owned the tractor,
which was under lease to Western Auto Transport. His
capacity .at the time of the accident was that of an
employee of Western Auto Transport.
T:he force of the collision caused one of the vehicles,
a pick-up truck carried by the WesteTn Auto Transport
vehicle, to break loose from the load and fall to the highway where it blocked the westbound traffic lane. Shortly
after the collison betwe·en the two tru,cks .a passenge!r
vehicle driven in a westerly direction by John Seh\veitzer,
while attempting to avoid eolliding with the dislodged
pick-up truck collided with the rear left portion of the
S & I trailer at the lef·t front of the vVestern Auto Transport tractor. Florence Schweitzer, a passenger in her
husband's car, filed suit for personal injury damage
against Harvey Stone, S & I Trucking Company, Lloyd
Higgenbotham, Fred Sullivan and \V estern Auto Transport Company. Ijloyd lfiggenhothain, vVestern Auto
2
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Transport .and Fred Sullivan cross-complained against
Harvey s~tone and S & I Trucking Company, who counter-cross-claimed. I van Sheffy filed a Complaint in intervention against Lloyd Higgenbotham, Western Auto
Transport and Fred Sullivan.
On the trial of the case Western Auto Transport,
Lloyd I-Iiggenbotham and Fred Sullivan settled the
Florence Schweitzer claim before the case was submitted
to the jury, \vhich returned a verdict of $23,000.00 against
all defendants with the exception of Fred Sullivan, who
\vas dismissed out of the case .a.s a party defendant as a
1natter of law. The further sum of $4,500.00 was returned
in favor of Ivan Sheffy on his ·Co1nplaint in interven~tion
again Lloyd Higgenbotham and Western Auto Transport,
and the sum of $8,000.00 in favor of Fred Sullivan on
his Cross-Complaint against Harvey Stone and the S & I
Trucking Company.
This is an appeal by Lloyd Higgenbotham and
'Vestern Auto Transport fro1n the judgment in favor of
Iv.an Sheffy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The collision between the s~talled S & I Truck and
the
estern Auto Transport truck occurred at about
10:30 p.1n., April 20, 1957, on an uphill grade about 14
miles vvest of Castle Rock in Summit Colmty, Utah, on
U. S. Highway 30. The highvvay at that point runs generally e.ast and west and is straight for ap·proximately
eight-tenths of a mile west of the s-cene of the accident.
The night "~as dark; it had rained earlier but at the

''T
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time of the accident the surface of the highway was dry.
Beginning app·roximately 600 feet to the west .at the start
of the grade, the highway was divided into two eastbound
traffic lanes approximately 12 feet in width and one
westerly traffic lane 19 feet in width. On the south side
there was a distance of 2.3 feet between the eastbound
outside lane and th.e edge of the hard surface. The
shoulder on the south side was sloped downward while
the edge of the hard surface on the north side was protected by guard rails. (Exhibit H 13).
Before the aceident a tr.actor pulling a flatbed type
trailer loaded with sacks of ''drill mud'' owned by the
S & I Trucking ·Company, and driven by its employee
Harvey Stone, 'vas p;roceeding easterly up-grade when
the engine began to sputter and stopped. Mr. Stone was
of the opinion that the main fuel tank was empty and
attempted to switch connections to the auxiliary fuel tank
without success, and the truck stopped in a diagonal
position with the righit front wheels slightly off the hard
surface and the rear of the loaded trailer extending
about three feet over the dividing line into the inside
eastbound lane. ( T. 138, 139, Exhibit 13). Mr. Stone
remained in the cab attemp·ting to start the engine by
operating the starter.
Ivan Sheffy, also an S & I employee, testified he
was driving a truck 1,000 to 1,500 feet to the rear of the
Stone vehicle when he saw it begin to turn from the inside to the outside lane. (T. 292). ,~Vhen he passed Mr.
Stone's truck it 'vas still moving. l\fr. Sheffy parked his
trurk about 400 to 500 feet further east, ( T. 295) and
4
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walked back to l\lr. Stone's 'truck where he stood on the
left side of the highway surface with his head in the cab
assisting Stone start the engine. Sheffy did not see the
lights of the approaching Western Auto Transport truek.
lie esti1nated he could see one-half mile of the highway
to the west (T. 309), and he did not hear the sound of the
approaching VV estern Auto Transport truck coming upgrade. ( T. 315). He testified there was noise from the
operation of the starter of the Stone truck (T. 318) which
vvas operated intermittently and not continuously. (T.
354). }u3 he was thus assisting Mr. Stone, Mr. Sheffy
\Vas R\vare of the fact that the truck was not protected
by flares (T. 310), and that the highway was heavily
traveled. (T. 307).
Lloyd Higgenbotham, an employee of Western Auto
Transport vvas driving a truck loaded with auton1obiles
and pick-up trucks, easterly. The tractor was leased to
\Vestern Auto Transport by Fred Sullivan, also .an
en1ployee of that comp·any and vvho was sleeping in the
cab co1npartment when the accident hap·pened.
As Lloyd Higgenhotha1n traveled easterly, he met
t\vo \Ves'tbound trueks about tv1o or three n1iles west of
the scene of the collision. He switched his lights from
high be.an1 to lovv beam and the switch ren1ained in the
lo\v beam position until the collision vvith the S & I truck
occurred. As he approached the scene his truck was in
the outside lane of traffic travelling 48 miles per hour.
(T. 97) There vvere no lights on the stalled vehicle (T.
99), and he did not become a \vare of its location on the
high,vay until he \Vas approximately 70 feet avvay. On
5
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first observation he couldn't determine what it was because the load blended into the color pattern of the highway. (T. 93). Mr. Higgenbotham attempted to turn the
Western Auto Transport truck to the left but was unable
to avoid colliding with the rear of the S & I load. (T.
100). Before he and Sullivan could get flares out, the
se:con,d collision involving Mr. Schweitzer occurred.
On the third day of trial Western Auto Transport,
Lloyd Higgenbotham and Fred Sullivan settled the clailn
of Florence Schweitzer against 'them. At the conclusion
of the evidence, the remaining issues between the parties
were submitted to the jury on a "special verdict." The
jury found unanimously that I-Iarvey Stone was negligent
in failing to have lights on or flares about the S & I truck
immediately before the collision and that such negligence
was a proximate cause of the collision. (T. 92). 'The jury
found unanimously that Ivan Sheffy was negligent in
exposing himself to the hazard in assisting Harvey Stone
to start ~the stalled truek when it was unlighted and not
protected by flares, and also that Sheffy was negligent in
failing to keep a proper lookout for his own safety, but
that neither finding of negligence was a proximate eause
of his injuries. ( T. 95).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION'' IN FAVOR OF
'THESE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST INTERVENOR IV AN
SHEFFY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL
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VERDICT, AND THE COURT WAS REQUIRED TO FIND AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT INTERVENOR SHEFFY'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY
AND DAMAGE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FAILING 'TO RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE CERTAIN PROFFERED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF WYOMING.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION" IN FAVOR OF
THESE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST INTERVENOR IV AN
SHEFFY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL
VERDICT, AND THE COURT WAS REQUIRED TO FIND AS
A l\1ATTER OF LAW THAT INTERVENOR SHEFFY'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY
AND DAMAGE.

At the conclusion of the evidenee the -court instructed
the jury generally on the issues raised in the case. Also,
pursuant to Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
court submitted to the jury a series of interrogatories in
\\Thich it 'v.as directed to make specific findings. The
pertinent portion of those questions submitted and the
ans\\Ters made by the jury are as follovvs:
"QUESTION I
(A) 'Vas Harvey Stone negligent by allovving the
gasoline of one tank to become exhausted
before svvitching to the auxiliary gasoline
tank~

Ans,ver: Yes
7
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If so, was such negligence a p,roximate cause
of the collision,
(a) Between the two trucks involved?
Answer: Yes
(b) Between the Schweitzer car and
two trucks involved?
Answer: Yes
(B) Was Harvey 'Stone negligent in failing to
remove the S & I truck from the travelled
portion of the highway~
Answer: N,o
If so, was such negligenee a proximate cause
of the collision,
(a) Between the two trucks involved?

Answer: No
(b) Between the Schweitzer car and
the two trucks involved?
Answer: No
(C) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing to
have lj~ghts on or flares about the S & I
truck immediately prior to the collision between the two trucks?
Answer: Yes
If so, was such negligence a
of the collision,

p~roximate

cause

(a) Between the. two trucks involved?
Answer: Yes
(b) Between the Schweitzer car and
the two trucks involved~
Answer: Yes''
8
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''QUESTION III
(A) D'id Ivan Sheffy negligently expose himself
to a hazard which he knevv or in the exercise
of a reasonable care should have known
might result in harm to him by assisting
H.arvey Stone to start the stopped truck
when there were no lights on sai~d truck with.
out first putting flares out to warn other
motorists of the presence of said truck?
Answer: Yes
If so, was such negligence a proximate cause
of the injuries which Ivan Sheffy received?
Answer: No
(B) Did Ivan Sheffy fail to keep such a lookout
for his own safety -vvhile he was assisting
Harvey Stone as would have been kept by a
reasonably prudent person under the same
circumstances?
Answer: Yes
If so, was such failure a proximate, cause of
the injuries to Ivan Sheffy?
Answer: No''
(R. 90)
After ans\vering the questions indica ted, the jury
returned a general verdict of $4,500.00 as damages sustained by Ivan Sheffy, (R. 97) and against Lloyd V.
Higgenbotham and Western Auto Transport Company.
(R. 106). These appellants took proper and timely exception to the court's ruling .and filed a n1otion for a
directed verdict and motion for a new trial. (R. 190 to
201).
Rule 49 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follovvs :
''. . . vVhen the general verdict and the ans9
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wers are harmonious, the court shall direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers. When the answers are consistent with each other, but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may
direct the entry of judgment in accordance with
the answers, nO'twithstanding the general verdict
or may return the jury for further consideration
of its answers and verdict or may order a nevv
trial. When the answers are in-consistent with
each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not
direet the entry ·of judgment but may return the
jury for further consideration of its answers and
verdict or may order a new trial.''
As noted above, Mr. Harvey Stone was found negligent in two particulars, both of which were found by the
jury to be the p·roximate cause of the collision between
the two trucks and the Schweitzer automobile. He was
found negligent in allowing ''the gasoline of one tank to
be-come exhausted before switching to the auxiliary gasoline tank,'' and ''in failing to have lights ·on or flares
about the S & I truck immediately prior to the collision
between the two trucks.'' Mr. I van Sheffy was found
negligent in exposing ''himself to a hazard which he
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, might result in harm to him by assisting Harvey
Stone to start the stopp·ed truck when there were no
lights on sa~d truck without f~rst putttng flares out to
wa.rn other 1notorists of the presence of said truck," and
also of failing ''to keep such lookout for his own safety
while he was assitsing Harvey Stone as "\Yould have been
kept by a reasonably prudent person under the same
10
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eirctunstance~."

The jury found that neither of these
findings of negligence as pertained to Mr. Sheffy vvere
the proximate cause of his injuries. These findings are
inconsistent.
lVIr. Sheffy's conduct at the time he returned to assist Mr. Ston·e is stated as follows: (R. 264)

"Q.

Now, what did you do after you back to
the truck, Mr. Stone's truck~

A.

After I rea'ched Mr. Stone's truck, he opened
the door and I asked him wha:t was wrong,
and-

A.

And he was trying to start his truck.
His engine was dead, was it~
His engine was dead. That's right.
And what was he doing in trying to start it~
He had-what was he doing~
Yes.
Well, he w.as turning it ·over.
With the starter~
With the starter. That's right, sir.
What did you do~
And I asked him if he was out of gas. And
he said: 'I don't know, it just stopped.'
And I figured he must be ; and when he said
that, I turned-they have a lit·tle valve right
on the left of the driver, and if you do run
out of g.as, you can switch to another tank
by turnng the valve, and so I did that, and
I told him: 'Do you have the electric fuel
pump on~' ..._L\.nd he said: 'Yes', and at that
same time he vvas trying to start it.''

* * *
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

11
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Mr. Sheffy observed that he could see one-half mile
to the rear of the Stone vehicle. ( T. 266). While assisting Mr. Stone, he ''leaned in ·the eab on the left side while
his feet remained on the ground." ( T. 266). He stated
further " ... I 'vas looking inside helping Mr. Stone trying to get his vehicle started." ( T. 266, 267). While thus
assisting Mr. Stone, he saw no lights or heard no noise
from an approaching truck or other automobiles. The
force of ·the impact with the Western Auto Transport
truck ''knocked (Mr. Sheffy) behind the duel wheels of
the tractor''. He didn't observe the direction or source
of the eollision.
Mr. Sheffy and Mr. Stone were engaged in doing
the same act-at the same place-at the same time. Since
the jury determined that the act of attempting to start
the truck in the dark of night "\Vithout the benefit of clearance lights or flares to protect themselves or approaching
traffic constituted negligence, \Vhich was the proxi1nate
cause of the resulting collisions, it is impossible to reconcile this finding with their finding t,hat the same negligenee was not a proximate cause of 1\fr. Sheffy's injury.
In .addition, ~1r. Sheffy was found to have been negligent
in failing to n1antain a proper lookout for his o'vn safety
under the circumstances. This finding seems obvious
since he testified that he could see one-half nlile to the
rear of the Stone vehicle, but yet failed to see the approaching lights of the Western Auto Transport truck.
It was .a cool .dark night in April and even though the
approaching Western Auto Transport truck "_,_as pulling
a heavy load up-grade, Mr. Sheffy failed to hear it as it
12
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approached. The negligence in e.ach partieular was continuing in nature.
There is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between the acts of Mr. Stone and Mr. Sh·effy. Each had
been found negligent on an additional ground; ~1r. Stone
in permitting his truck to run out of gas, .and Mr. Sheffy
in failing to maintain a reasonable p·rudent lookout for
his own safety. Such is of no comfort or assistance to
Mr. Sheffy, however, beeause both Mr. Stone and Mr.
Sheffy were found guilty of a common act of negligence
"\vhich under the circumstances of this case cannot be the
proximate cause as to one and not the proximate cause
as to the other. As a matter of fa;ct, Mr. Sheffy 's established negligence of failing to maintain .a reasonable
lookout for his own safety was continuing and concurrent
"\vith his negligent act of attempting to start the truck
under the circumstances indicated.
There is no evidence of an independent intervening
cause vvhich is sufficient to insulate Mr. Sheffy's established negligence as a p-roximate cause. Farrell vs. Cameron, 98 Ut. 68,94 P. 2d 1068, (1939). The chain of events
\vhich vvere set in motion by the eombined and concurrent negligence of Mr. Sheffy and Mr. Stone were continuing and under the facts of this case, causation cannot
legally be separated between them.
Since the jury had deterrnined Mr .S:heffy's negligence, the court should have found proximate cause
under the circumstances as a matter of law because the
'' ... evidentiary facts are of such conclusive character
13
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as to require
ultimate fact
result of his
249 p. 2d 213,

all reasonable minds to eonclude that the
... of p~roximate cause ... '' existed as a
conduct. Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 122 Ut. 312
215 ( 1952).

This ease is similar to the case of Remy v. Exley
Produce Express, 307 P. 2d 65, (Calif. 1957). Plaintiff
Remy brought an action to recover for damages arising
out of a collision between his truck with defendant's approaching truck which had crossed the center line at
approximately the same location where co-defendant B
and B Auto Sales automobile had been left stuck in a
snow bank on the defendant's side of the highway. Defendant Exley Produce Express filed a cross complaint
against the plaintiff, Remy and co-defendant B and B
Auto Sales. In the main action the plaintiff was given
judgment against both defendants Exley Produce Express and B and B Auto Sales. On the cross complaint
Exley \Vas given judgment against B and B Auto Sales.
The court observed at page 67:
' '·This, then, brings us to the question of
whether the verdicts and judgment were inconsistent, one with the other. Plaintiff's verdict and
judgment were against both the parked cars (B &
B Auto Sales) and the Exley truck. Thus, there
was an i1nplied finding that both were negligent,
but the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the
Exley truck and against a parked c.ar (B & B
Auto Sales) thereby impliedly finding that while
the Exley trtlck, \vhose damage was due to its
collision with plaintiff's truck, was negligent as
against plaintiff's truck, it 'Yas not negligent as
against the p·arked cars. Put another way, the
jury impliedly found that \vhen the Exley truck
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collided with plaintiff's truck the cause, so far
as the injury to plaintiff's truck was concerned,
'vas the joint negligence of the parked cars e.nd
the Exley truck, and yet the damage to the Exley
truck in that same collision, was solely caused by
the negligenee of the parked cars.

* * *
'' ... It is elear that the two verdicts and judgInent, finding as they impliedly do, that Exley in
one act was 'negligent and not negligent' are inconsistent, and that the judgment appealed fron1
cannot stand.''
While the cited case deals in terms of negligence it
is submitted that under the circumstances of the p·resent
case, the established negligent conduct of Mr. Sheffy and
1\Ir. Stone cannot .at the same time be the proximate cause
as to one but not of the other.
Again in the case of Detrixhe v. klcQuigg, 316 P. 2d
617, (Okla. 1957), a problem of inconsistent verdicts "\vas
considered. In that case Dick C. Detrixhe was operating
a pick-up truck belonging to Edward P. Detrixhe & Sons,
a partnership, of which he was a member, in an easterly
direction along a county road. George L. Dietrixhe, who
\vas not a 1nember ·of the partnership, was a passenger
in the pick-up. As the vehicle approached the summit of
a s1nall hill, .an automobile o-wned and driven by Joseph
:JicQuigg can1e over the hill proceeding west,vard. The
two vehicles collided in the center of the road. All the
named individuals 'vere injured and the vehicles damaged .. There "\Vere three actions initiated:

1. By Dick C. Detrixhe, against ~IcQuigg, to recover for his personal injuries. In this c.ase ~feQuigg
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cross petitioned against Detrixhe for his personal Injuries and damage to his car.
2.

By George Detrixhe against McQuigg; and

3. Edward P. Detrixhe & Sons, a partnership,
against McQuigg.
By stipulation the three cases were consolidated and
tried by the same jury, although separate instructions
were given in each action.
In the first action, Dick C. Detrixhe was granted a
recovery. On defendant's eross claim the jury found for
defendant McQuigg.
In the second action, the jury found against MeQuigg
and in favor of George Detrixhe, and
In the third case, the jury found against J\fcQuigg
.and in favor of Detrixhe & Sons, a partnership.
The court accepted the last t,vo verdicts and resubmitted the first after further instructions, ··whereupon
the jury returned the following verdict:
We, the jury *** find for the defendant J oseph H. McQuigg on his cross petition, and against
p·laintiff Dick C. Detrixhe ... ''
It is immediately observed that the jury found
McQuigg negligent in t\vo actions and not negligent in
another, and likewise found Diek Detrixhe free from
contributory negligence in two .actions, but negligent in
his ovvn. The court found that the verdicts were inconsistent and granted a new trial.
See also the case of Stat.z v. Pohl, 63 NW 2d 556,
(Wise.), where a jury in an auto1nobile collision case
found the driver negligent as to control, but determined
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that such negligence \vas not a proximate cause of the
accident. In an answer to a question inquiring as to
comparative negligence, the jury found that the driver's
negligence ·contributed to cause the accident to the extent
of 20 percent. The verdict was inconsistent and a new
trial was granted.
Where proximate cause is clear it becomes the duty
of the trial court to direct a verdict. Here the question
was considerably simplified inasmuch as the negligence
of l\Ir. Sheffy was established as \Vas the negligence of
~lr. Stone. It is submitted that under the facts of this
case, the continuing established negligence of Mr. She.ffy
superimposed upon his further negligence of failing to
1naintain a reasonable lookout for his own safety, was a
proxi1nate ·cause of his injury which was sufficient to
bar his recovery of any damages for injuries received.
The trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in
favor of these appellants and against Mr. Sheffy on the
issue of proximate cause, and in failing to grant a new
trial because the jury's answers to interrogatories \vere
inconsistent \vith the general verdict.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COlVIMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FAILING 'TO· RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE CERTAIN PROFFERED WORKMEN'S COl\1PENSATION RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF WYOMING.

During the course of the trial, the attorney for
\Y.estern Auto Transp·ort .and its drivers Lloyd Higgenbotham and Fred Sullivan, tendered in evidence a medical report prepared by Dr. Knapp, which had been p·repared for and filed \vith the Department of Workmen's
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Compensation of the State of \¥yoming. (Ex. H 30).
The report revealed the results of a medical examination
made by Dr. Robert D. Knap·p concerning the physical
condition of Mr. Ivan Sheffy between April 26th and
August 10, 1957. The reports indicate~d that 1\{r. Sheffy's
injuries were of a temporary nature and that he did not
sustain permanent disability as a result of the accident.
Further, a report of Dr. Robert K. Knapp bearing date
December 7, 1958, was read in evidence in which he stated
that Mr. Sheffy had suffered a permanent physical disability as a result of the accident. (T. 287). Also, ~1r.
Sheffy testified to a conversation with Dr. Knapp in
which the doctor allegedly told him that he had a ''permanent injury". (T. 313). The proposed exhibit \vas
offered for two purposes: (1) As evidence of the
physical condition of Ivan Sheffy as reported by Dr.
Knap·p to the Worlanen's ·Compensation Department of
Wyoming, and (2) For the purpose of impeaching the
testimony of Ivan Sheffy relative to his mentioned conversation with Dr. Knapp and to impeach the report of
Dr. Knapp which was read in evidence. The two reports
were inconsistent. The fact that Dr. Knapp was not
present in eourt to personally testify does not make his
Workman's Compensation report objectionable since his
report of Decen1ber 7, 1958, was read with the san1e effect
as though he were present, and his testimony in thus
subject to i1npeachment.
Each docun1ent offered in evidence \\'"as certified .as
follows:
''I do

hereb~T

certify this docun1ent to be an
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

authentic copy of like document in the official fileR
of this Department.
State of Wyoming
C. J. 'Doc' Rogers
State Treasurer & Fund Trustee
By Wm. P. Petry
Director of Workmen's Compensation
(Seal)
Workmen's Compensation Dept.
Wyoming.
(Seal)"
The inforrnation contained in the report had direct
bearing upon the issues before the eourt and the jury;
namely, the physical condition of intervenor Ivan Sheffy
and the truthfulness of his statements relative to his conversation vvith Dr. Knapp. Certainly the documents were
material .and relevant. Under the provisions of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the compens!ation records were
properly authenticated and were admissible in evidence
for the purposes indicated.
Article IV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of he United
States requires that :

"Full faith and credit shall be given to each
state to the public .acts, records, and judieial proceedings of every other state . . . ''
Pursuant to further provisions of this section, the
United States ·Congress passed certain statutes establishing maximum standards of authentication of documents,
and if those standards are met, one state is bound to
accept in evidence the authenticated document of the
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other. (828 U.S:C.A., Sec. 1738, 1739). The standards of
authentication so established were not intended to preempt this area of state relationships, and does not preclude (\ne state from requiring less proof of authenticity
of reeo~ds or copies of a sister state than is prescribed
by the Federal Statutes indicated. As was observed in
the case of Willock v. Wilson, (178 Mass. 68, 59 N.E. 757),
"Neither the Federal Constitution nor the
statutes forbids. the state from authorizing the
proof of records in other ways than in their own
state courts ; provided, always, of course, that the
state statutes, if put in force, shall not have t:he
effect of excluding a record authenticated according to the requirements of the Federal Statute.
Thus, if the authentication satisfied the local
statute, it need not be conformed to the requirements of the Act of Congress.''
See also Black v. Schafer, 62 Okla. 114, 162 P. 456 (1917).
Other eases are cited in 5 L.R.A. (New Series) 940.
The legislature has defined the standard of proof of
authentication of the "official records" necessary to
make the records or documents of sister states adnlissible
in Utah. Rule 44(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as the same is pertinent here provides:
"An official record or en try therein, \vhen
.admissible for any purpose, 1nay be evidenced by
an official publication having the legal publication
thereof or by a eopy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and in the absence of judicial knowledge of competent evidence, .accompanied "\Yith a certificate
that such officer has the custody . . . "
Further light is cast upon this problen1 by Rule 44
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(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as
follows:
''As used in this Rule 'official record' shall
mean all public \Vritings, including laws, judicial
records, all official~documents, and public records
of private writings.''
Since Rule 44(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
defines ''official record'' within the framework of Rule
44( a), it would appear to he the intention of the legislature to give definite meaning to ''official records,., as
referred to in the rule. The statute, in defining ''official
records,'' includes not only those documents ordinarily
considered to be official but includes all "official documents and p~tblic records of private wr~tings."
Under the p·rovisions of the Wyoming law, compensation clain1s are filed with and under the supervision of the
District Court of the county where the injury occurred.
(Wyoming Statutes, Sec. 27-113). Section 27-118 of the
Wyoming Statutes is significant:
"Every award within the meaning of this
Act is a judicial determination of the rights of the
employer, the e1nployee, and the Industrial Accident Fund.''
The Director of Workmen's Compensation is a public
orfice created within the office of the State Treasurer
of the State of Wyoming. (Wyo. Statutes 9-82). The
recor-ds of that office are similarly public in nature. Dr.
I\:napp's medical report which w.as prepared under direction of the Director of vVorkmen's Compensation, although prepared by a private physician, became a public
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document by reason of its inclusion in the files of the
Director of vVorkmen 's ·Compensation, and as such comes
within the purview of Rule 44 (a) and (e).
In reviewing Rule 44(a), it is to be observed that the
certification of the foreign document is to be made by
the person having "legal custody of the record.'' The
rule states that ''. . . in the absence of judicial knowledge or eompetent evi,dence,'' the record is to be a;ccompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
A review of the certification appearing on the Workmen's
Compensation Reports will indicate that each document
w.as certified to and signed by Mr. William P. Petry,
Director of Workmen's Compensation. His signature
is then accompanied by the seal of the Department on
which is inscribed ''Workmen's Compensation Department Seal, Wyoming.''
It is submitted that the court should have taken judicial knowledge of the fact that the Director of Workmen's
Compensation has custody of the records within his department.
Under the p~rovisions of 78-25-1, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), certain facts are identified of \vhich the
courts in Utah take judicial notiee; however, facts other
than those statutorily identified are also "~thin the .ambit
of such judicial kno,,r ledge. In this connection, the Supreme Court has stated in the case of Stale v. La1rrence,
120 Utah 323, 234 P. 2d 600, (1951),
''Beyond the scope of the statute providing
that certain matters \Yill be taken judicial notice
of, there is another elass of facts which are so
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well known and accepted that they are judicially
noticed without taking the time, trouble and expense necessary to prove the1n. Under this doctrine the court will consider, "\vithout proof of such
gener.ally known facts, its knowledge of what is
known to all persons of ordinary intelligence. * * *
'"rhis court has recognized that class of judicial
notice in a great variety of matters ... ''
It is submitted that the fact that the Director of
vVorkmen 's Compensation h.as the legal custody of the
records of his department is a matter so generally known
to all persons that the trial court should have taken
judicial notice of the same.
The lavvs of a sister state .are said to be presumed
to be the same as the laws of Utah, in the absence of proof
to the contrary. Wh~tmore Oxygen Company v. Utah
State Tax Comm~ss~on, 114 Utah 1, 19·6 P. 2d 976. And
even though such presumption is made in the instant ease,
the result is the same because it is a matter of statute and
COffilllOn knovvledge that the Director of vV orklnen 's Colnpensation in Utah has custody of the records of his deparbnent 35-1-1- et seq., U. C.A. ( 1953).
Aside fro1n the plain language contained In Rule
-±-± (e) U.R. C.P. relative to ''official documents,'' decided
cases have admitted similar reports in evidence for similar purposes.
In the case of Hardison Seed Company v. Jones, 149
F. 2d 252, (Sixth Cir.1945), the 'Var Food Administrator
sought and obtained .a cease and desist order against
the defendant seed company for imp·roperly labeling its
seeds which "\vere being distributd in interstate commerce.
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A review of that order was sought claiming lack of evidence to prove imp-roper labeling. Evidence indicated
that samples of the seeds shipped by the defendant were
taken by a representative of the State of Alabama and
also by a Federal representative. Analyses were made by
each of those individuals, but they vvere not called as witnesses at the trial; however, a report was prepared by
each .analyst which was received in evidence. The claim
was m·ade that such evidence was incomp-etent, being
hearsay, that its admission deprived the defendant of the
right to cross exan1ine the seed analyst, and .an enforcement of the order of the food administrator would deprive the defendant of due process of law. In this connection the court stated:
''Reports which are of a public nature and
taken under .a competent authority to ascertain
a matter of public interest are admissible in evidence against the vvhole world. It is not essential
to the admission of evidence of this nature that the
inquiry should have been made by virtue of some
judicial authority .and by means of ''itnesses examined upon oath. It is suffieient if it was made
by virtue of competent authority on behalf of the
public and on a subject matter of publie interest.
(\Vigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, \ 1ol. 5,
Sec. 1670)
* * *
''. . . The records in question were of .a public character, n1ade and kept for a public purpose, and they c.on1e \vithin the rule \vhich admits
in evidence records kept by persons in public office in vvhieh they are required, by the nature
of their offiee, to \\Trite do\vn particular transactons oeenrring in the eourse of their publir duties
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or lmder their personal supervision. (Evanston
v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660, 666, 25 Law. Ed. 306.) The
evdence was admissible; its weight was for the
administrator.''
Siinilarly, in the case of JYI or an v. Pittsburgh-Des
IJ!oimes Steel Company, 183 F. 2d 467 (Third Cir. 1950),
a similar result was achived. In that instance recovery
was sought from a defendant company for damages incurred through the eruption of a steel tank. A claim was
made that the defendant 'vas negligent in manufacturing
the tank in the shape of a cylinder rather than in the
shape of a sphere. The plaintiff offered in evidence a
report by the Bureau of l\{ines, U.S. Department of Interior, 'vhich tended to substantiate this elaim. The report was received in evidence, even though conclusionary
in nature.
The C·ircuit Court, in finding that the report w.as admissible without the necessity of calling the five individuals who prep·ared it, stated:
''The report is no less admissible because it
contains conclusions of experts which are based
upon hearsay evidence as well as upon observation. These circumstances, by virtue of expressed
statutory provision, go to the weight rather than
to ad1nissibility. Moreover, this court has several
times held that hospital reeords are admissible
under the statute, and certainly medical diagnosis
is no less .a matter of opinion based upon observation and perhaps hearsay than this report of the
Bureau's investigation.'' (Citing cases.)
See also the case of United States v. lVare, 247 F. 2d
G98 (Seventh Cir. 1957), "\vhere an exhibit prepared by
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Federal nareotic agents and chemist was found admissible.
''We think that there can be no doubt that the
exhibits or memoranda made by the chemist were
admissible as having been made in the regular
course of business and that it was the regular
course of business to make such memoranda or
record of the findings of the chemist's analyses
of the substances purchased from the defendant.''
The case was reversed on other grounds.
The Circuit Court in the case of Olender v. United
States, 210 F. 2d 795 (Ninth Cir. 1954), denied in evideooe
the report of a welfare care worker, because it was hearsay. In order to come within the official documents
exception to the hearsay rule the court said that:
''. . . the facts stated in the documents must
have been \vithin the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official or his subordt"'nates, and that reports based upon general
investigations and upon information gleaned
secondhand from random sources must be excluded.''
Of course, the Circuit Court did not have the benefit
of a statutory definition of "official docmnents" as is
provided by Utah Rule 44( e) U.R.C.P., diseussed above.
It is further submitted that a doctor \vho makes a report
to the Director of W orlnnen 's Compensation, as was done
in the instant case, is acting under the supervision of the
Direetor and is a subordinate for that purpose. The Director is the only one w·ho could properly certify to the
authenticity of the doeuments tendered in evidence.
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At the time the question documents were offered in
evidence, they were offered not only for the purpose of
..;howing the physical condition of ~fr. Sheffy, but also
for the purpose of in1peac;hing the testimony of Mr.
Sheffy and his doctor. The courts have held that while
documents may not be admissible for one purpose, they
n1ay be for another. This principal of evidence was
clearly de1nonstrated in the case of Brown and Root v.
Haddad, 180 S.W. 2d 339 (Texas, 1944). There an official report as to the cause of an .accident was admitted
in evidence for the purpose of impeaching the testimony
of the person making the report. An action had been
filed by the plaintiff for "\vrongful death. At the time the
Highvvay Patrolman made his report, he stated th.at the
defendant's truck driver had informed him that he was
blinded by bright lights and unable to see the decedent
pedestrian in time to avoid the collision. The report conflicted "\Vi th his direct testimony at the trial where he
stated that a n1uddy windshield prevented the defendant
from observing the decedent.
The court stated that vvhile the patrolman's report,
as sueh, \vas a hearsay statement and should have under
the circun1stances of the case been excluded at the trial,
if objected to on that ground, that sueh parts of his report as may tend to impeach any direct evidence was
admissible. To the san1e effect, see Fttiesen v. Schmelzel,
318 P. 2d 368 CV{yo. 1957).
In addition to the authenticated Workmen's Compensation Reports being admissible to show nir. Sheffy's
physical condition, they were adn1issible for purposes
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of imp.eachment, and even though it were determined by
this court that they were not admissible for the first purpose for which they were proffered, they were clearly
admissible for the second.
CONCLUSION
The records of the Department of Workmen's Compensation of the State of Wyoming were "offieial records'' authenticated in accordance with the intent and
meaning of Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
trial court corrrrnitted reversible error in failing to receive
them as Exhibit H 30 for the purposes offered. First,
to show the physical condition of Mr. S~heffy on the dates
of the examinations made by Dr. Knapp as revealed in
the reports; and Second, for the purpose of impeaching
the testimony of Mr. Sheffy and a subsequent medical
opinion prepared by Dr. Knapp.
The trial court erred in failing to find as a matter
of law that Mr. Sheffy''s negligence proximately caused
his injuries. Further, reversible error was comnritted in
failing to grant a ne\v trial to these ap·pellants because of
the jury's inconsistent findings. It is respectfully submitted that this court should direct such a verdict, or in
the alternative, grant a new trial.
Resp·ectfully sub1nitted,
HANSON, B1~DWIN & ALLEN
& ~.fER LIN R. L YBBER.T
Attorneys for Defenda.nts and
Appellants
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